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The Effect of Economic Downturns on Apprenticeships and 
Initial Workplace Training: A Review of the Evidence
*
 
The existing empirical evidence on the relationship between apprenticeships, initial 
workplace training and economic downturns, is relatively scarce. The bottom line of this 
literature is that ratio of apprentices to employees tends to be (mildly) pro-cyclical and to 
decline during a recession, with the notable exception of the Great Depression, when it rose 
(at least in England). When broader measures of training are considered, which exclude 
apprentices, the weight of the evidence is in favour of counter-cyclical training incidence. This 
paper suggests that a possible reconciliation of these findings is based on recognizing that 
firms may have incentives to train incumbents during a downturn and at the same time to 
reduce the recruitment and training of young employees, who are engaged in the transition 
from school to work. 
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The world economy is experiencing a severe economic downturn. GDP growth is 
slowing down sharply and is expected to be negative in 2009 in the US, Japan, Britain and the 
Euro area. Unemployment is rising and consumer demand is falling, as the real economy is hit 
by the consequences of the financial turmoil.  
Recessions are times of “cleaning up”, when outdated or unprofitable techniques and 
products are dismissed and new technology is adopted (Caballero and Hammour, 1994). During 
recessions, the flows out of employment increase and the flows into employment fall. The 
intensity of these flows vary with age: in the US, young workers experience the highest increase 
in outflows and the highest decline in inflows. Old workers are less likely to exit but experience 
a substantial decline in employment inflows (Blanchard and Diamond, 1990). Therefore, it is 
especially the young and the old who are negatively affected by a recession. In many European 
countries and in Japan, where employment protection legislation and practices shelter 
permanent employees from redundancies, the brunt of employment adjustment in the recession 
falls on reducing recruitment, especially of the young (Gielen and van Ours, 2005)
1.  
What is the expected effect of the economic downturn on the provision of human capital 
within firms? There is no quick answer to this question. On the one hand, the cleansing role of 
recessions calls for additional investment in organizational capital, inclusive of training. On the 
other hand, we know that training incidence is highest among young employees (see for 
instance Bassanini et al, 2007): since employment is reduced, at least initially, by cutting on the 
recruitment of young workers, average training incidence can fall in a downturn as the result of 
a shift in the composition of employment towards older and more protected workers.  
In answering this question, it is also important to distinguish between shallow and 
severe downturns, and between short training programs, which last a week or a month, and long 




will affect short programs more than long programs, because the expected benefits of the latter 
will accrue mainly when the economy has already recovered. On the other hand, deep recessions 
as well as prolonged slumps, similar to the one experienced by Japan in the 1990s, may have 
broader and lasting effects on training.  
During recessions, time spent at work becomes relatively less valuable with respect to 
time spent at school or in workplace training. Individuals and firms shift their efforts from 
production to retooling their skills and updating their organizational capital. Enrolment in 
schools increases and training intensity, both in the classroom and on the job, rises. With 
complete and perfect markets, this reallocation needs not require government intervention: 
students can borrow more to support higher tuition fees, schools can offer additional slots and 
firms can find the resources to fund additional training. Furthermore, wages are sufficiently 
flexible to encourage the recruitment of apprentices. In practice, markets are far from perfect, 
and government intervention, both in education and in training, is common. Do government 
policies work? What policies should be adopted to foster the human capital of the young? These 
are difficult questions, but luckily the economics literature provides some tentative answers. 
The purpose of this review is to examine the existing empirical evidence on the 
relationship between economic downturns and the provision of workplace training to young 
individuals. This training includes mainly apprenticeships but also short programs – such as 
internships and traineeships. As defined by Ryan, 2000, apprenticeships are “...a formal, 
structured programme of vocational preparation, sponsored by an employer, that juxtaposes part 
– time off the job instruction with on the job training and work experience, leads to a recognized 
vocational qualification at craft or higher levels, and takes at least two years to complete. In 
continental Europe, vocational and general education form part of the package and 





In most countries where apprenticeships exist, they tend to concentrate in manufacturing 
and construction. They are typically accompanied by a set of institutional arrangements that try 
to resolve some of the problems associated with the scheme, including low educational content, 
free riding, and under-training, and by government intervention, both as a regulator and (often 
but not always) as a generous supplier of subsidies. Table 1 at the end of this paper illustrates in 
a compact way some key features of apprenticeships
2. It is widely recognized that these 
institutions work rather well in the countries of Continental and Nordic Europe, but are 
somewhat less effective in Anglo – Saxon countries
3.  
 The review is organized as follows: in the first Section I briefly look at the economic 
theory; the empirical literature on apprentices and the business cycle is examined in Section 2. 
Section 3 considers other types of training, including schooling. Section 4 summarizes the 
evidence. In Section 5 I ask what data are available to pursue further research in the area. 
Section 6 is devoted to policy implications. Conclusions follow.  
 
1. Apprenticeships and the business cycle: the theoretical arguments 
 
A good starting point in discussing how economic downturns can affect apprenticeships 
and short – term workplace training episodes is the investment model by Stevens, 1994. This is 
an investment model because it views the demand for apprenticeship as an investment for future 
production, in contrast with models which emphasize instead the opportunity of substituting 
more expensive skilled labour with less expensive apprenticeships for the purpose of current 
production (see Lindley, 1975).  
Firms in Stevens’ model need to choose between two alternative modes of filling future 
skilled vacancies: hire skilled labour when the future need arises or train unskilled young labour 




relative costs and benefits. If trained apprentices and skilled labour are perfect substitutes, 
expected benefits are the same. Costs, however, differ: they are training costs for apprentices 
and recruitment costs for skilled labour.  
Training costs include the wage paid to apprentices - net of their contribution to output 
during training – and the costs of training facilities, materials and trainers
4. Compared to 
training costs, the costs of recruiting skilled labour are only born when recruitment occurs.  If 
skilled labour were abundant and easy to locate and recruit when needed, few firms would train 
apprentices, unless the burden of the cost of training could be shifted to trained workers or the 
taxpayer. When future recruitment is costly, however, firms may be willing to offer 
apprenticeship contracts if by so doing they can produce in-house and at a lower cost the skills 
required by the time the need arises, and save future recruitment costs (see also Saint Paul, 
1993, Brunello and Medio, 2001, Ryan, 2009, and the references therein).  
I extend this model to examine the effects of the business cycle. Suppose that a 
downturn sets in, with a negative temporary shock to current revenues, and that apprenticeships 
last for a few periods. Due to the temporary nature of the shock, the future benefits of training 
are unaffected, and so is the expected cost of recruiting skilled labour in the future. Suppose also 
that apprentice wages are unchanged. Then the temporary shock has two effects: on the one 
hand, current productivity declines; on the other hand, if part of the training is carried out by 
senior workers, their foregone production also declines. The former effect increases training 
costs and the latter reduces it. If the decline in the apprentice’s productivity prevails, training 
costs increase and the incentive to train now rather than hire in the future falls.  
When current output declines but future expected output is unchanged, and there are no 
costs of adjusting labour, recruitments decline and redundancies of skilled and unskilled labour 
take place. In this case, although in a downturn the absolute number of apprentices may fall, the 
ratio of apprentices to employees can increase. When there are substantial costs of adjusting 




Recruitments fall, including those of new apprentices. In this case, the ratio of apprentices to 
employees can be pro-cyclically.  
Compared to apprenticeships, which usually take a few years to complete, training 
programs of short duration are negatively affected both by the temporary reduction in the 
current demand for skilled labour and by the decline in the current cost of recruiting skilled 
labour. Therefore, I expect that, ceteris paribus training courses of short duration are more 
affected than long courses by temporary shocks.  
Next consider a prolonged downturn, which affects both the current and future periods. 
If the shock extends to the time when apprenticeships are expected to be completed, there are 
two additional factors at play: first, future recruitment costs fall, and hiring skilled labour from 
the market when the need arises becomes relatively more convenient; second, the future scale of 
production is reduced, and so is the need for skilled workers, independently of whether they are 
trained inside the firms or recruited from outside. Therefore, compared to the case of a 
temporary shock, a prolonged downturn is more likely to affect negatively training programs 
which last several periods of time, such as apprenticeships. With a prolonged shock, labour 
hoarding is a less viable option and redundancies increase. In this case, both the numerator and 
the denominator of the ratio of apprentices to employees are affected negatively and to a larger 
extent than in the case of a temporary shock.  
An alternative to the investment model of apprenticeships is the substitution model, 
which states that the relative demand for apprentices depends on output as well as on their 
wages relative to those of skilled employees. Assuming that relative wages are not affected by a 
temporary downturn, the substitution hypothesis predicts that a temporary reduction of output 
leads to a reduction in the number of apprentices and skilled labour employed by the firm, with 
no change in their relative share. When skilled labour is costly to adjust, however, firms may 
choose to have a core of skilled permanent labour and a periphery of temporary labour – 
including apprentices – who can be hired in upswings and shed in downturns




  So far, we have considered the decision to recruit apprentices or to offer training 
courses to new recruits. Yet an economic downturn affects also the training of current 
employees. Since the value of foregone production declines, recessions are times for 
reorganization and for the production of organizational capital (Hall, 1991). One facet of 
reorganization is training: firms temporarily hoard idle employees in a downturn and train them 
in the expectation that their productivity will be higher when the next expansion returns. When 
labour hoarding is important, apprenticeship training may fall in a recession even though 
continuous training – which refers to (adult) employed workers - increases.  
Finally consider training episodes initiated by individuals rather than by firms. During 
recessions individuals re-direct their activities away from production and toward leisure, home 
production and the production of human capital. By doing so, they take advantage of the lower 
foregone costs of production. If training requires resources, however, the shift toward training 
during a downturn could be hampered by the presence of liquidity constraints
6.   
 
2. Apprenticeships and the business cycle: the empirical literature 
 
The existing empirical research on the cyclical pattern of apprenticeships and initial 
workplace training covers only a few developed countries. Typically, but not always, this 
evidence is based on econometric estimates that associate initial workplace training to business 
cycle indicators. The main findings are summarized in Table 2 at the end of the paper. In this 
section, I review this evidence. In the next section, I consider instead the few empirical studies 
which have looked at the relationship between a broader definition of training and economic 
downturns.  
In her empirical application of the investment model discussed in the previous section, 




1988. The recruitment of first – year craft trainees fell considerably in the early 1970s, in the 
wake of the first oil shock, recovered in the second part of the 1970s and fell sharply again 
during the 1980-81 recession. Stevens is mainly interested in the association between the ratio 
of apprentice recruitment to craft employment – in logs – and an index of relative skill 
shortages, which captures the cost of recruiting skilled labour: the tighter the labour market the 
higher the cost
7. Her empirical results show that this association is positive. It is not clear, 
however, whether her results can be taken as supportive of her theory, which suggests that the 
recruitment costs that matter are not the current ones but those at the time when apprentices are 
expected to have completed their training.  
More interesting for the purposes of this review is the estimated relationship between 
the business cycle and the ratio of apprentices to employees. A positive relationship would 
suggest that this ratio is pro-cyclical; a negative relationship would point instead to a counter-
cyclical behaviour. In one of the empirical specifications she presents, Stevens shows that the 
log ratio of apprentices to employees decreases when: a) the CBI capacity shortage index 
CAPSH increases; b) the CBI index of absolute skills shortages SKSH declines. Both indicators 
move pro-cyclically and attract similar coefficients. Since the difference between SKSH and 
CAPSH is pro-cyclical, this evidence suggests that the ratio of apprentices to employees 
declines during downturns.  
In another study using data from the British engineering industry, Hart, 2005, examines 
how the employment of apprentices and skilled journeymen adjusted during the years of the 
Great Depression. He uses data that cover 27 district associations of the Engineering Employers 
Federation, 8 occupations and the period 1928 to 1938. He estimates dynamic employment 
equations for apprentices, crafted journeymen and the ratio of the two, using the current and 
lagged change in the district unemployment rate as an indicator of business cycle conditions. He 




response of the former was delayed with respect to the latter; b) the ratio of apprentices to 
journeymen moved counter-cyclically. 
According to Hart, the quicker response of the employment of journeymen to worsening 
labour conditions can be explained by wage rigidity, which made many journeymen 
unprofitable from the outset of the recession. In the absence of employment protection 
measures, the sudden decline in output was met initially with the layoff of journeymen and only 
in a second time with the shedding of (cheaper) apprentices. As suggested by the investment 
model presented verbally in the previous section, the delayed adjustment in the number of 
apprentices can be interpreted as the consequence of the fact that the decline in output was 
initially considered as temporary and became prolonged only later. An alternative explanation 
based on the substitution hypothesis is favoured by Hart, who argues that firms in the 
downswing preferred to retain initially experienced apprentices, who were cheaper than the 
journeymen and could do most of their work.  
  In a third study of the UK experience, Felstead and Green, 1996, examine the impact on 
training of the recession of the early 1990s, using data from the Labour Force Survey. In their 
descriptive analysis they report that the total number of apprentices declined from 367,000 in 
the spring of 1989 to 312,000 in the spring of 1992, a 15 percent decline. The percentage of 
employees on an apprenticeship scheme was mildly pro-cyclical, hovering around 1.5 percent, 
not far from the value taken in the mid to late 1980s
8. Considering the severity of the recession, 
the decline in the proportion of employees receiving training was a small one
9.  
  In a recent study of apprenticeships in the US construction industry, Bilginsoy, 2003, 
examines how the cancellation and completion rate of apprenticeships vary with the business 
cycle, measured by the state unemployment rate. In the US, apprenticeships have traditionally 
played a much smaller role in the training of labour than in Europe, partly because the 
institutional arrangements required to ensure incentive compatibility – firms don’t fail to deliver 
training and individuals do not quit before the end of the training scheme - have been lacking




Apprenticeship schemes have survived mainly in the construction industry, and last between 
three to four years. Cancellations occur when the apprentice quits the scheme; completions can 
vary in duration depending for instance on the availability of training jobs.  
  Bilginsoy uses the data from the Apprenticeship Information Management System 
compiled by the Bureau of Apprenticeship Training, which contain information on the 
apprenticeship start and exit rates and type of exit of more than 10 thousand apprentices over the 
period 1989 to 1995. He estimates a competing risk model with two hazards, the cancellation 
and completion hazard, which measure the probability of leaving the stock of apprentices at a 
given point in time, and finds that both cancellations and completions moved pro-cyclically, 
which implies that the stock of ongoing apprentices was higher in a downturn. Cancellations 
decline in a downturn because apprentices have fewer opportunities of quitting and taking up 
semi-skilled jobs that pay a higher wage than apprenticeships
11. Completions also decline as the 
number of training jobs falls. Bilginsoy’s study is interesting because of the emphasis it places 
on the apprentice’s choice, rather in contrast with Stevens’ model, where the key decisions are 
taken by profit maximizing employers
12.  
  Evidence that the share of apprentices in total employment is pro-cyclical is presented 
by Askilden and Nilsen, 2005, in their study of the Norwegian labour market. Apprentices in 
Norway are based on the “2+2” system, with the former two years spent in vocational schools 
and the remaining years with a firm (see Kuczera et al, 2008). Askilden and Nilsen model the 
demand for apprentices and adult workers (aged 18 years or above) using a translog cost 
function. Under the assumption that the cyclical variation of cost shares is dominated by 
quantities rather than prices, they estimate the association between these shares and the 
unemployment rate, both current and four quarters ahead, using quarterly data collected by the 
Norwegian Employers’ Federation on the manufacturing and construction industries for the 




They find that the employment of adult workers increase both with the current and with 
the forward unemployment rate, which they interpret as evidence that firms employ skilled 
labour when it is in abundant supply (the unemployment rate is high)
13. They also find that the 
number of apprentices is pro-cyclical and decreases with the current and forward unemployment 
rate. The latter finding is consistent both with the investment model, because a lower forward 
rate signals higher recruitment costs for skilled labour, and with the substitution model, which 
implies that apprentices belong to a more flexible peripheral labour force, that increases in 
booms and falls in downswings. Overall, their results imply that the ratio of apprentices to adult 
workers is pro-cyclical. 
Norwegian students enrolled in vocational tracks need to find a suitable slot in firms to 
complete their apprenticeships. In an economic downturn, when there are fewer vacancies, 
completion can take place at school, but is clearly a second best solution (see Kuczera et al, 
2008). Because of this, the ratio of apprentices to students enrolled in vocational schools is 
likely to increase in a boom and fall in a downturn. An admittedly gross way of exploring this 
aspect further is to express the ratio of apprentices to students enrolled in upper secondary 







         ( 1 )  
where A, T and V denote the stock of apprentices and the stock of students enrolled in upper 
secondary education and in the vocational track respectively
14.  
I use the data from Statistics Norway to plot in Figure 1 the ratio of apprentices to 
pupils in secondary education (A/T) against the national unemployment rate during the period 
2001 to 2007: there is a clear negative relationship, with the ratio increasing when the 
unemployment rate falls. At the same time, the ratio of apprentices to pupils in VET schools 
(A/V) declines and the percentage of pupils in VET schools (V/T) increases when the 




pro-cyclical because the increase in the share of VET students taking up an apprenticeship in an 
economic upswing more than compensates the decline in the percentage of pupils enrolling in 
VET tracks.  
A candidate reason why the ratio V/T increases during an economic downturn is that the 
percentage of school dropouts who leave vocational schools follow a pro-cyclical pattern: when 
the economy is expanding, the value of time at work raises relative to time at school and many 
pupils enrolled in the VET track find opportunities to work in the labour market without going 
through an apprenticeship
15. Since in the Norwegian system individuals who started work 
without completing an apprenticeship are allowed to sit exams for skill certificates after a few 
years of work experience, dropping out of school in an upturn to take up better paying jobs 
appears to be a valid alternative to apprenticeships.  
The country which has attracted international attention for the quality of its 
apprenticeship system is Germany, with its dual system of education (see Ryan, 2001, 
Culpepper, 1999, Harhoff and Kane, 1999). A similar system is implemented also in Austria 
and Switzerland. A descriptive study of the effects of the recession of the early 1990s on the 
German apprenticeship system is carried out by Wagner, 1998. She compares the apprentice 
training ratio (apprentices to employees) in 1990 and 1995 in West Germany and finds that this 
ratio fell from 7 to 5.5 for the entire economy, from 10.9 to 8 among firms with 1 to 9 
employees and from 5.2 to 4.3 among firms with at least 500 employees. She also finds that the 
percentage of plants doing apprentice training declined from 28.3 to 23.7 percent during the 
same period. In the absence of a multivariate analysis, however, it is difficult to attribute this 
decline to the economic downturn, because other factors could matter, including changes in 
industrial composition and long term trend effects
16. In contrast, Jaconebbinghaus, 
Mohrenweiser and Zwick, 2008, show that the percentage of apprentices during the downturn of 
the early 2000 was quite stable, which they interpret as showing that German business does not 




Schweri and Mueller, 2008, use Swiss firm data for the years 1995, 1998, 2001 and 
2005 and find that the percentage of training firms is positively correlated to average GDP 
growth in the past three years. Furthermore, they present a graphical analysis of the correlation 
between the rate of GDP growth and the share of individuals aged 16 who are involved in an 
apprenticeship. The share is pro-cyclical, in line with the Norwegian results discussed above. 
Westergaard Nielsen and Rasmussen, 1999, study instead apprenticeships in Denmark, using 
data on 720 plants with apprentices during the period 1980 to 1991. They find that the 
probability of having a new apprentice is positively associated to the rate of new hires and 
negatively correlated to the rate of job leavers, which points again to the pro-cyclical behaviour 
of workplace training. 
3. Training and the business cycle: the empirical evidence  
  In this section, I briefly review the literature on the relationship between the business 
cycle, schooling and the accumulation of workplace training, including continuous training. The 
selected contributions are summarized in Table 3 at the end of the paper. Sepulveda, 2004, 
develops a real business cycle model with employment adjustment costs, labour hoarding and 
counter-cyclical training activities. In a downturn, the foregone production cost of training 
declines, labour is retained because of the presence of adjustment costs and training occurs, 
much in the spirit of Hall’s model of organizational capital (Hall, 1991)
17. Sepulveda uses data 
from the US National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY) to construct a panel of individuals 
aged 14 to 22 in 1979, which he follows until 1998. He focuses on the incidence and intensity of 
off-the-job and on-the-job training, measured in hours and net of apprenticeships, and reports 
that they are weakly counter – cyclical, lead the cycle and are highly volatile, with a standard 
deviation of more than 10 times that of output
18.  
  Majmudar, 2007, also uses NLSY data for the period 1979 to 1988 but finds that the 
probability of receiving company training decreases when the local unemployment rate 




statistically significant for workers who have joined the firm since the last wave. Majmudar 
motivates his results as the outcome of two countervailing effects, with the latter dominating the 
former: on the one hand, labour market opportunities for trained workers are fewer in a 
downturn, which reduces their bargaining power with the firm and increases the employer’s 
incentive to train. On the other hand, there are many alternatives to training in a slack labour 
market, which induce firms to hire rather than train.  
  Bassanini and Brunello, 2008, study the relationship between product market regulation 
and workplace training, using data for 15 European countries and 8 years drawn from the 
European Labour Force Survey. They only consider individuals aged 25 to 54, which rules out 
most apprenticeship episodes. They find that their measure of training incidence – the 
proportion of employed individuals who received training in the four weeks before the reference 
week – is negatively correlated to their measure of the business cycle, the logarithm of worked 
hours filtered from trend with the Hodrick – Prescott filter, in line with Sepulveda’s findings for 
the US. 
  Dellas and Sakellaris, 2003, study the relationship between schooling and the business 
cycle. Their contribution is interesting for the purposes of this review because it illustrates the 
key factors at play in the individual decision to invest in human capital, either at school or in a 
training institution. The key trade-off here is between the opportunity cost of training, which 
declines in a downturn, and ability to pay, which is typically lower in a recession. In the absence 
of borrowing constraints, human capital accumulation is counter – cyclical. However, if credit 
markets are imperfect and individuals are liquidity constrained, investment can turn pro-
cyclical
19. Their empirical evidence on the pattern of college enrolment in the US shows that 
enrolment is counter – cyclical, which suggests that the opportunity cost argument prevails. 
Similar evidence is presented by King and Sweerman, 2002, who show that school retooling – 




qualitative similarity of these results with those obtained by Bilginsoy on apprenticeship 
training in the US and with our discussion of enrolment in vocational schools in Norway. 
  An additional reason why young individuals tend to stay on or to enrol in school during 
a downturn is that entering the labour market in a recession can have persistent effects on 
employment prospects and earnings. Oreopoulos, von Watcher and Heisz, 2008, for instance, 
show that the initial earnings loss is substantial and fades only after 8 to 10 years after 
graduation
20.  
In Asia, the Japanese experience is of particular interest. Japan experienced a prolonged 
slump after the burst of the asset prices bubble at the end of the 1980s. The Japanese 
unemployment rate increased sharply, especially among the young. Considering the age group 
20 to 24, it rose from 3.7 percent in 1990 to 8.7 percent in 1999 (see Genda and Rebick, 2001). 
In spite of the slump, the so called lifetime employment system was basically unchallenged, 
with permanent employees enjoying a high degree of employment protection (see Ariga, 
Brunello and Ohkusa, 2000; Kato, 2000). Its relative share of total employment, however, 
declined at the expense of an increased periphery of temporary workers, mainly young, who 
could not find access to the guaranteed core. Extensive dismissals of core employees were by 
and large avoided, especially during the first part of the 1990s, but the recruitment of new 
young workers as permanent employees was drastically cut. Because many Japanese (large) 
firms provide extensive training to their new permanent recruits and hire mainly if not 
exclusively at well defined ports of entry, one of the effects of the slump was the increase in the 
average age of permanent employees. Since training intensity declines with age, an additional 
likely effect was the reduction in average training incidence and intensity. This reduction could 
not be compensated by the increased recruitment of temporary employees, because these 
workers typically receive less training (see Genda and Kurosawa, 2001 and Ariga, 2006).  
Notice the contrast between the Japanese experience during the slump of the 1990s and 




above. In the latter case, lack of employment protection meant that firms in the engineering 
industry reduced first the number of skilled journeymen and only in a second time the number 
of apprentices. In the former case, the presence of substantial costs of adjusting permanent 
labour led to a drastic reduction in the recruitment of the young in permanent jobs and to the 
expansion of a periphery of temporary labour, who received less training. Because to the 
duration of the Japanese slump, many young school graduates, who were unlucky enough to 
enter the labour market in the early 1990s, ended up trapped in a sequence of temporary jobs, 
more or less losing their chance to find their way into the core of permanent employment when 
the economy eventually recovered. The economic cost in terms of foregone opportunities to 
accumulate human capital has not been estimated but could have been substantial
21. 
The observation that prolonged recessions could trigger the expansion of temporary 
contracts is not only based on the Japanese experience. In an investigation of the Swedish slump 
of the early 1990s, Holmlund and Storrie, 2001, argue that that recession induced an initial 
decline in temporary employment, followed by a sharp rise from the through to its end. Fixed – 
terms contracts were only 10 percent of total employment in Sweden in 1990 but rose to 16 
percent at the end of the decade. A similar – and even sharper – experience was shared by 
Finland. Since temporary workers are known to receive less training, one of the potential side 
effects of a prolonged slump is the permanent reduction in average training intensity associated 
to a shrinking core of permanent employees and to an increased share of temporary labour.  
4. Summary 
The existing empirical evidence on the relationship between apprenticeships, initial 
workplace training and economic downturns, is relatively scarce and limited mainly to Anglo – 
Saxon and Nordic countries. We know relatively little about the countries of continental Europe, 
where the apprenticeship system is widespread and widely admired (Germany, Austria, 
Switzerland). There is also need to cover other countries, especially those in Southern Europe 




to economic slumps, and on whether the relationship between initial workplace training and the 
cycle varies by sector and with firm size and is affected by labour and product market 
institutions.  
In spite of the paucity of empirical research, there is a broad perception that the 
provision of training is negatively affected by a recession. If one looks at the total number of 
trainees or apprentices, this could be simply due to the fact that employment falls in an 
economic downswing. If one focuses instead on the percentage of employees who receive 
training, the empirical evidence discussed above does not provide a clear picture. Most of the 
reviewed studies that consider apprenticeships suggest that the ratio of apprentices to employees 
is pro-cyclical and declines during a recession. The few studies that focus on broader measures 
of training and exclude apprentices, however, point to a counter-cyclical behaviour, with 
training incidence that increases during a downturn.     
One way to reconcile the existing evidence is to distinguish between young labour 
market entrants and incumbent employees. Since the latter have accumulated valuable firm 
specific human capital, firms are often reluctant to lose their skills because of a temporary 
downturn and tend to engage in some form of labour hoarding, which includes the provision of 
training. Because of this, the training of incumbents could increase in a downturn. At the same 
time, firms also reduce recruitments of new employees, and thereby offer fewer apprenticeships. 
Hence, young labour market entrants in a downturn are more likely to be unemployed or to end 
up in temporary jobs, which offer limited training. For this age group, training falls. The 
retention of incumbent insiders and the reduced recruitment of young outsiders are clearly 
affected by the nature of the downturn – whether it is temporary or prolonged – and by labour 
market institutions. For instance, these practices are more likely to be observed in countries 
where the employment protection of incumbents is stronger, and less likely when regulation is 




Other potentially relevant institutions that can impact on training incidence include 
labour unions, bargaining frameworks and product market regulation. There is evidence that 
some of these institutions affect training (see Bassanini et al, 2007, and the references therein), 
but no evidence that they affect the relationship between training and economic downturns. To 
address these questions we need data. In the next section, I shall briefly review what 
international and national data are available, and assess whether they can be used to improve our 
knowledge of the issues at hand.  
 
5. Potential empirical research in the area 
 
  In Europe, international harmonized surveys that cover several countries and have 
information on training include the European Labour Force Survey (ELFS), the European 
Community Household Panel (ECHP) and the European Labour Costs Survey (ELCS). The first 
and the third are repeated cross sections, the second is a panel; the former two are household 
surveys and the latter is an employer survey.  
  The European Labour Force Survey contains information on training and individual 
characteristics such as age, gender, education, labour market status, part time / full time 
employment, occupation, industry. There are 23 countries in the waves covering the period from 
1992 to 2002. Additional countries have been added afterwards, mainly from Eastern Europe, 
and the definition of many key variables has been changed, making it difficult to use these data 
until the late 2000s. The survey asks individuals whether they have been in education or training 
during the four weeks before the interview. This relatively short period of recall reduces the risk 
of recollection errors at the price of omitting training spells which have ended before the period 




For those who give an affirmative answer, additional questions on the duration and type 
of training are asked. In particular, there is a question which potentially allows one to 
distinguish between initial education or training and continuous vocational training. 
Unfortunately, this question has been re-framed in 1998, which reduces comparability over 
time. Moreover, there are many missing values (especially in Italy, the Netherlands and 
Portugal). On top of this, the question does not allow to distinguish between education and 
training, which is especially problematic for the very young who are not employed. The 11 
years covering the period 1992-2002 include both the end of the recession of the early 1990s 
and the downturn of the early 2000s. If we proxy the phase of the business cycle with the 
unemployment rate, additional variation can be obtained by focusing on the region of residence, 
and by comparing regions with high and low unemployment. In spite of its limits, these data can 
be used to study how training incidence in the young age group vary with economic conditions 
in a relatively broad group of countries and to investigate what role different institutions can 
play in changing the shape of the relationship between training and the cycle.  
  The European Community Household Panel is a household longitudinal survey which 
includes labour market information on European individuals aged 16 or older. Individuals 
participating to the survey are asked whether they have been in education or training since 
January of the year before the interview. Those who give an affirmative answer are then asked 
to indicate the type of the vocational education course, and the list of available answers include: 
third level qualification, such as technical college; specific vocational training at a vocational 
school or college; specific vocational training within a system providing both work experience 
and a complementary instruction elsewhere; specific vocational training in a working 
environment. Unfortunately, the number of missing observations is relevant for countries such 
as the United Kingdom, Austria, Finland and Sweden. Additional questions are also asked on 
the duration of the relevant course (typically the last). A problem with these data is that they 




of the survey ELFS, one can try to exploit the cross-regional variation in economic conditions, 
see Majumdar, 2007, for the United States.  
  The European Labour Costs Survey is an employer survey that has been carried out 
every four years from 1984 to 2004, and covers the core of the European Union plus some 
Nordic and Eastern European countries. Its renewed version will be on a quarterly basis. These 
data have information on the number of apprentices and trainees by industry and firm size. 
Starting with the 2004 wave, they also include information on training costs, which consist of 
the wages and salaries of trainees and apprentices. Assuming that the survey is carried out 
regularly in the future, it will be useful to investigate how training costs have been affected by 
the current recession.  
  National labour force surveys have the type of information already described in the case 
of the survey ELFS. The US Current Population Survey, for instance, includes a relevant 
question on training (“At any time last year, did you attend a training program to learn specific 
job skills, such as computer word processing, auto mechanics, nursing, providing child care, or 
a skill for some other job or vocation?”). Household surveys with a longitudinal structure 
contain information on education and training over a relatively long period of time. Given the 
length of time covered and the wealth of information, these data can be particularly useful to 
study how economic downturns affect initial training targeted at young individuals. Examples 
include the German SOEP (Socio-Economic Panel) and the British BHPS (British Household 
Panel Survey). The former covers the period 1984 to 2006 for West Germany, and 1992 to 2006 
for unified Germany. The latter runs yearly from 1993. These datasets have information on 
current education and training, labour market status, occupation and earnings. The German 
panel, for instance, asks interviewed individuals aged 16 or older who belong to the selected 
panel of households whether they are currently in some sort of education, and if yes, 




have not been used so far to investigate the relationship between training and economic 
downturns. 
6. Policies 
In many countries public intervention that focuses on apprenticeships is not limited to 
designing formal rules, but also includes financial support. These policies are often justified with 
the argument that in the absence of public intervention the market produces less than the optimal 
share of apprentices
22.  
In the apprenticeship systems prevailing in Germany, Denmark, Austria and the 
Netherlands the state pays for formal education while the firms and apprentices pay for the training 
on-the-job. In some case, the state also offers additional subsidies, as in the case of Denmark. The 
role of firms as financing subjects is very important in these countries. In France firms pay an 
apprenticeship tax that dates back to 1925 and is mainly used by enterprises to finance – together 
with the state, local communities and professional organizations - the cost of apprentice training in 
the Apprenticeship Training Centres. In other countries, for example Italy, the public contribution 
is considerable and firms which offer these contracts are exempted from paying nearly 100% of 
payroll taxes. On the other hand, training content and quality is subject to low monitoring (Croce, 
2005). 
Training policies are an important component of active labour market policies (ALMP) in 
OECD countries. The OECD has developed a database on public training expenditures covering the 
period between 1985 and 2006. Labour market training within ALMP is divided into two 
categories: a) spending on vocational and remedial training for unemployed adults; and b) training 
employed adults for labour market reasons. Furthermore, youth measures include training and 
employment programmes targeted at the young unemployed and apprenticeship training for school 
leavers (Martin and Grubb, 2001). Public training expenditure as a percentage of GDP in 2006 
ranged from below 0.1 percent in Japan and the Anglo-Saxon countries to above 0.3 in Germany, 




of growth of real GDP per capita, I obtain that a one percent reduction in GDP growth is associated 
to a 3.84 percent increase in training expenditure. Therefore, public outlays to encourage training 
increase when GDP growth declines.  
Do these policies work? When evaluating the effects of training policies on individual 
earnings and employment prospects, one needs to consider both deadweight losses and substitution 
effects. These policies might fail to substantially increase the number of skilled employees, either 
because part of the financial support goes to investments that would have been realized anyway, or 
because firms may substitute workers who are not affected with the recipients of training policies. 
In the case of deadweight losses, both the efficiency and the equity arguments usually employed to 
back up policies are undermined, since the final beneficiary of the subsidy is not the worker, but the 
employer, who would have delivered the training even without the public policy. Substitution 
effects may be particularly relevant in an economic downturn, because additional subsidies paid out 
to firms to hire apprentices may reduce employment opportunities for unskilled and semi-skilled 
labour not targeted by the policy.  
In a recent evaluation of a tax relief policy used in The Netherlands to encourage firms to 
invest in the training of workers aged 40 years or older, Leuven and Oosterbeek, 2004, find no 
evidence of additional training, but substitution across ages. While this study does not explicitly 
consider apprenticeships, it suggests that substitution effects across different groups of employees 
are important. In a study of Switzerland, Muellemann, Schweri, Winkelmann and Wolter, 2007, 
argue that unnecessary deadweight losses can be avoided is subsidies could only be targeted to non 
– training firms. In this case, the economic cost would be rather modest. If, however, the exclusion 
of training firms is not feasible, the public cost of creating additional training positions would be 
very high. 
There is a large literature which evaluates the effects of labour market programmes, 
including training. Heckman, Lalonde and Smith, 1999, review this literature and conclude that 
training policies have limited impact, with partial exception for European countries, where the 




also examine this literature and conclude that the evaluation of public training programmes in the 
OECD suggests a mixed track record: some programmes work, mainly for adult women
23, but other 
programmes don’t work, especially for disadvantaged youth. In most cases the estimated gain 
involves employment opportunities. Card, Kluve and Weber, 2009, produce a meta analysis of 
existing studies and conclude that on the job and classroom training programmes are not favourable 
in the short run (1 year) but have a relatively better impact after two years
24. Short run effects could 
even be negative because of the presence of lock-in effects: program participants reduce their 
search intensity relative to non participants during training.  
Lechner and Wunsch, 2006, ask whether training policies are more effective in a downturn, 
when they can be argued to be needed most. Using German data that track different policies for 
close to ten years, they find that the negative lock-in effects are smaller and the positive long-run 
effects are larger in times of high unemployment.  
In the current recession, policy proposals to combat the current recession emphasize 
additional investment in education and training. President Obama’s 2010 budget plan submitted to 
the US Congress, for instance, includes significant increases in education funding. The German 
recovery plan for 2009 devotes 6.5 millions Euros for investment in infrastructure of schools and 
universities. The OECD, 2009, suggests that growth-enhancing structural policies can be useful 
also to enhance short term growth
25. Two such policies are infrastructure projects that improve the 
quality of existing infrastructure, particularly in education, and increasing expenditure on active 
labour market policies to “... provide workers with the skills that will be needed as the economy 
recovers, including through the use of compulsory training programmes” (p.19).  
In the light or the mixed results reviewed above, the design of training policies seems to be 
particularly important to enhance their effectiveness. Martin and Grubb, 2001, propose that the 
following four criteria should be met: 1) tight targeting on participants; 2) programmes should be 
kept relatively small in scale; 3) they should result in a qualification or certificate that is recognized 
and valued by the market; 4) programmes should have a strong on the job component in the 




In some countries, including Denmark, Germany and Norway, the government tries to 
compensate for the decline in the number of apprentice positions – for instance due to an economic 
downturn – by allowing pupils to complete their apprenticeship in a vocational school. Is this a 
sensible policy? Given the high persistent costs of entering the labour market during a recession 
without having completed upper secondary education, I am inclined to give a positive answer. Is 
this policy more effective than paying subsidies to employers who offer additional apprenticeships? 
Westergaard Nielsen and Rasmussen, 1999, estimate the impact of the Danish subsidy paid out to 
firms who take up apprentices. This subsidy was introduced in the late 1970s, reduced in size in 
1986 and finally discontinued in the 1990s. They use a longitudinal panel of Danish firms spanning 
the years 1980 to 1991 and find that the subsidy has had an impact on the supply of apprentice 
positions only in some industries. They estimate that in the affected industries the demand for 
apprentices would have been 7% smaller in the absence of the subsidy. They also estimate that the 
cost to the public purse of a newly created apprenticeship is high, but still considerably lower than 
the estimated cost of having pupils spend an additional year in vocational schools.  They conclude 
that paying subsidies is more cost effective that offering public places in schools. One problem 
with subsidies is cream skimming by private employers and the possibility that the less talented and 
motivated youngsters – who cannot complete their education – are excluded. Another problem is 
that the presence of generous subsidies may induce firms to use apprentices to fill in unskilled or 
semi-skilled positions, where little training is involved.  
A lesson one can draw from the Danish study is that governments already pressed with 
alternative uses of resources in a downturn may turn to additional subsidies if this helps reducing 
the number of pupils who complete their courses in vocational schools. Unless the training activity 
of firms is adequately monitored, however, results may be disappointing and the consequences of 
substitution effects may add to the public burden in terms of higher unemployment insurance and 
social assistance.  
Policy intervention that encourages training – both on the job and off the job - is perhaps 




hit by the recession are precluded from finding a permanent job, which provides adequate training 
opportunities. The Japanese experience of the 1990s suggests that the risk of being trapped in a 
sequence of temporary jobs with little training is serious, with permanent consequences on 
individual human capital and wellbeing. At least in part, this risk is closely intertwined with the 
presence of generous employment protection for the core of senior permanent employees. 
Bassanini et al, 2007, in their study of training in Europe find that average training incidence is 
negatively affected both by the diffusion of temporary contracts and by the presence of 
employment protection for regular workers.  
The current downturn is accompanied by a sharp reduction in trade flows and by emerging 
risks of protectionist policies. Policies that limit competition in the product market could damage 
training. Bassanini and Brunello, 2008, estimate the effects of product market deregulation and 
increased competition in Europe on training incidence and conclude that the estimated effects are 
significant: depending on the selected measure of regulation and on the empirical specification, 
a 10 percent increase of regulation reduces training incidence in the exposed industries by 2.8 
to 5 percent. The lesson one can draw from this is that training policies are not necessarily the 
only and perhaps not the best tool available to support training in a prolonged downturn: 
structural policies that favour product market competition and labour market policies that 
reduce the dualism between protected insiders and unprotected outsiders may deliver better 
payoffs than subsidies to workers and employers, which are plagued by the presence of 
deadweight and substitution effects.  
 
Concluding remarks 
The existing empirical evidence on the relationship between apprenticeships, initial 
workplace training and economic downturns, is relatively scarce. The bottom line of this 
literature is that ratio of apprentices to employees tends to be (mildly) pro-cyclical and to 




least in England). When broader measures of training are considered, which exclude 
apprentices, the weight of the evidence is in favour of counter-cyclical training incidence.  This 
paper suggests that a possible reconciliation of these findings is based on recognizing that firms 
may have incentives to train incumbents during a downturn and at the same time to reduce the 
recruitment and training of young employees, who are engaged in the transition from school to 
work. 
Training policies are an important component of active labour market policies in the 
OECD countries and a potential tool to address the decline in the accumulation of human capital 
which could take place in a downturn. In spite of their diffusion, the empirical evidence on their 
efficacy is mixed: they often don’t work, and if they work they do so in the medium term by 
affecting employment probabilities. Some commentators have concluded from this not that 
these policies should be abandoned, but that they should be accurately designed to improve their 
effects. Yet training policies are not the only tool available to foster the accumulation of human 
capital within firms: more structural policies, which affect product market regulation and labour 
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Table 1:   Apprenticeship contracts in selected OECD countries 
  Germany Austria  Denmark  Netherlands  Ireland    UK 
            
Principal National  
Statutes 
 
Vocational training Act 
1981 1984  
Vocational training  
Act 1969 1993  
1997 
Apprenticeship  
Act 1937, 1956, 
 1989 
Apprenticeship 





Industrial Act  
1937 
 
Target group  No upper limit  No upper age limit.   
Advantages for older  
people  
Age 15 or 16.  
Special shorter  
programme for older  
than 25 
At least 16, no upper 
 limit 
At least 16, no upper 
 limit 
16-25 




























Training duration  2-4  2-4  3-5  2  4  Unspecified 
Mandatory 
Educational Content.  
Share of: 







4/5 of the training  



























































Some groups of  workers.  
Tax  reductions for training 
companies and reductions  
of social security  





















            
Relative  pay  20-45%  40-60%  51-54%  n.a. n.a. 60% 




Table 1:   Apprenticeship contracts in selected OECD countries - continued 
  Finland   Belgium Flemish Belgium French   Spain  France  Italy 
           
Principal National  
statutes 
 
  Decree  dated  3/7/91, 
decree dated 4/5/95 
 
Decree 5281 1977 
Royal decree law  
18/1993 




Law N. 25/1955  
and N. 6/1987,  
Decree n.276, 2003 
Target Group  At least 15, no  
upper limit 




In some cases 16-24 
16-25 15-24 




























Training duration  2-3 years  1-3 years  3 years  6 months 
3 years 
2-3 years  2-6 years 














1 or 2 days a week 
 
12 hours/week 
in the first year  
and 8   hours / week  













120 hours of  
formal training both  




















































Tax relief; reductions  
of social security contributions 
apprentices 
Relative pay  80%  n.a.  n.a.  60-80%  n.a.  n.a. 
           




Table 2:   The Cyclical Behaviour of Apprenticeships 
Study and Country  Data Dependent  Variable  Explanatory Variable  Qualitative results  
Askilden and Nielsen 
(2005), Norway  
  Quarterly 1990-1996 
  Firm level 
 
Cost shares – apprentices of any age 
and workers older than 18 (adults) 
Current unemployment rate  t u  
Forward unemployment rate (4 
quarters)  4  t u  
Training pro-cyclical 






Log(apprentices/ craft employment)  CBI capacity shortage CAPSH 
CBI skill shortage SKSH 
Training ratio pro-cyclical 
Felstead and Green 
(1996), United 
Kingdom 
Labour Force Survey – 
recession early 1990s 
  Percentage doing apprenticeship 




 Training incidence mildly pro-cyclical 
 Mild decline of apprenticeships in the downturn 




  log apprentices 
  log journeymen 
 
  Change in current 
unemployment rate  t u   
  Change in current 
unemployment rate  1   t u  
Training pro-cyclical  




720 plants with 
apprentices 1980-1991 
Probability of having a new 
apprentice 
  ratio of new hires ENTRY 
  ratio of leavers EXIT 
 Probability of training pro-cyclical 
Schweri and Muller, 
2008, Switzerland 
Firm data 1995, 1998, 
2001, 2005 
  % of training firms 
  % of young (age 16) who start an 
apprenticeship 
  Average GDP growth in the past 
3 years 
 % of training firms positively correlated with 




1990 and 1995 (includes 
the German recession of 
early 1990s) 
  Apprentices to employees  
  % of firms doing training 








  cancellation of a program hazard  
  completion of a program hazard 
 
Unemployment rate  t u  
 
 Cancellations pro-cyclical 
 Completions pro-cyclical 








Table 3:   The Cyclical Behaviour of training and schooling 
Study and 
Country 




Survey of Youth 1988-96 
Workers who have joined 
the firm since last wave 
Probability of receiving 
company training  




Survey of Youth 1979-98 
quarterly 
  hours spent in OJT 
  hours spent in OFFJT 
  training incidence 
 
  quarterly GDP  Training and training incidence  
counter-cyclical 
Dellas – Sakellaris 
(2003), United 
States 
Current Population Survey 
High school graduates aged 
28-22 
College enrolment    GNP 





European Labour Force 
Survey; employees aged 25 
to 54 
Training incidence  Log worked hours filtered with the HP 
filter 





















































.02 .03 .04 .05 .06
unemployment rate























.02 .03 .04 .05 .06
unemployment rate
VET students / upper sec students
 
                                                 
1 See also The Economist, You Are Hired – Next Year, May 2 2009, pp.60-61. 
2 The table was originally produced by Ryan, 2000, and extended by Bassanini et al, 2007.  
3 See Harhoff and Kane, 1997, for a discussion of the German apprenticeship system from the perspective 
of the US labour market. 
4 Harhoff and Kane, 1997, examine the evidence for Germany and conclude that the training costs born 
by employers during the apprenticeship period are substantial. In contrast, Muellemann, Schweri, 
Winkelmann and Wolter, 2007, show that the majority of Swiss firms manage to recoup their costs before 
the end of apprenticeships. This difference is related to the higher retention rate after completion of 
apprenticeships in Germany than in Switzerland, which allows training companies in the former country 
to recoup their training costs after the end of apprenticeships.  
5 See for instance Boeri and Garibaldi, 2007, and the references therein. 
6 Dellas and Sakellaris, 2003, discuss these issues in the context of college education. 
7 This index is computed as the difference between the CBI (Confederation of British Industry) skill 
shortage index and the CBI capacity shortage index. 
8 See also Greenhalgh and Mavrotas, (1993), who investigate the effects of the UK recession in the 
early 1980s. 
9 In autumn 1992, Felstead and Green interviewed 157 mostly small and medium-sized employers to 
understand how their training strategies changed during the 90-92 recession. They found that 43% of 
respondents claimed to have increased their training activities in the last two years, while 27% reported 
no change, and 25% reported cutbacks in training. 
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